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Abstract
Budgets play a significant role in real-world sequential auction markets such as those implemented
by Internet companies. To maximize the value provided to auction participants, spending is smoothed
across auctions so budgets are used for the best opportunities. Motivated by a mechanism used in prac-
tice by several companies, this paper considers a smoothing procedure that relies on pacing multipliers:
on behalf of each bidder, the auction market applies a factor between 0 and 1 that uniformly scales the
bids across all auctions. Reinterpreting this process as a game between bidders, we introduce the no-
tion of pacing equilibrium, and prove that they are always guaranteed to exist. We demonstrate through
examples that a market can have multiple pacing equilibria with large variations in several natural ob-
jectives. We show that pacing equilibria refine another popular solution concept, competitive equilibria,
and show further connections between the two solution concepts. Although we show that computing
either a social-welfare-maximizing or a revenue-maximizing pacing equilibrium is NP-hard, we present
a mixed-integer program (MIP) that can be used to find equilibria optimizing several relevant objectives.
We use the MIP to provide evidence that: (1) equilibrium multiplicity occurs very rarely across several
families of random instances, (2) static MIP solutions can be used to improve the outcomes achieved
by a dynamic pacing algorithm with instances based on a real-world auction market, and (3) for the
instances we study, bidders do not have an incentive to misreport bids or budgets provided there are
enough participants in the auction.
1 Introduction
In the last decade, auction markets have become a pervasive mechanism used by Internet companies to
match bidders to their target audience at the right price. The mechanisms put in place select users matching a
targeting rule that bidders specify, allowing them to bid for selected events of interest such as an impression,
a click, a conversion or a video view. This results in a winning bidder who is given the chance to show an
impression and potentially generate the event of interest. In these auction markets, bidders typically specify
a budget that can be spent over a certain sequence of auctions, as well as valuations for the events of interest.
It is a responsibility of the mechanism to guarantee that the total payments of bidders do not exceed the
budgets they specified. The simplest way to take budgets into account is to bid as if there were no budget
constraint, until the bidder runs out of budget. At that time, the bidder effectively stops participating in
the auctions. Unfortunately, this simple procedure is clearly not optimal: if the bidder is able to anticipate
that the budget will run out well before the time period is over, it makes sense to bid less aggressively at
earlier stages to be able to participate in later auctions. These later auctions, after all, may have some of
∗This work was done while the author was visiting Facebook Core Data Science.
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Figure 1: Relation bids vs. total value for a budget of $10
the best opportunities for the bidder since, for example, they may provide the same value at a lower price.
Figure 1 shows an example in which a bidder has a $5 value for winning and a $10 budget. Here, a Vickrey
(second-price) auction is used at each step. We assume, for simplicity, that all bids are per impression. As
shown on the left, the bidder is able to possibly win any one of the auctions for that value, but can only win
the first 6 auctions before running out of budget. The bidder receives a total value of 6× $5 = $30 at a cost
of $10, for a utility of $20. Instead, as shown on the right, the bidder can win more auctions and get a higher
utility bidding $2. The bidder wins 7 auctions for a total value of 7× $5 = $35 at a cost of $10, for a utility
of $25.
The previous situation motivates that auction market mechanisms more actively take budgets into ac-
count. One possibility is to perform probabilistic pacing, which consists of tossing an appropriately weighted
coin for each auction. The outcome determines whether a bid is actually placed into the auction on the bid-
der’s behalf. Selecting each probability appropriately, the bidder’s budget will run out just around the end of
the bidding period. Doing this for all bidders results in the process being more stable over time—as opposed
to having many bidders early on and then auctions becoming thinner as bidders run out of budget, as shown
on the left side of the figure. Still, this approach also has its drawbacks. Bidders will not be considered in
some auctions purely because of a coin toss, and the missed opportunities may be the ones where the bidder
could have won at lower cost. Thus, this alternative may be suboptimal for bidders as well.
Another solution is to appropriately shade bids on the bidders’ behalf. (Again, for simplicity, consider a
bidder who is bidding on a per-impression basis; appropriate modifications can be made for a bidder bidding
on a per-click basis.) When it appears that simply bidding the valuation vi will result in the budget being
spent before the period is over, the mechanism can simply shade down each bid to αivi, where αi ∈ [0, 1] is
referred to as a pacing multiplier. An optimal multiplier will make the budget run out exactly at the end of
the period, unless the bidder would not run out of budget even with αi = 1.
Motivated by the multiplicative mechanism which is used by several Internet auction markets, we set out
to study the details of the associated static game, which has not been the subject of a prior methodical study.
One of the reasons that justifies its widespread use is that multiplicative pacing allows a bidder to participate
in more auctions and win at lower prices, compared to probabilistic pacing. Further, Balseiro et al. (2017)
conclude that multiplicative pacing is optimal out of various options they study.
To motivate the interpretation of the mechanism as a game, note that each bidder is affected by the other
bidders’ multipliers. For instance, for two bidders i and j, if bidder i’s multiplier αi goes down, this may
result in bidder j winning more impressions, so αj needs to go down too. Or, alternatively, it may result in
bidder j having to pay less for the impressions she is winning (because j was setting the price for i, given
that we use a second-price auction), so that αj can go up. Because the effect can work in both directions,
and bidder i is similarly affected by αj , it is not obvious that there must exist a vector of multipliers for all
bidders that is mutually optimal. The first question we address is whether there is a vector of multipliers
that are simultaneously optimal for all bidders in a market with multiple single-slot auctions. To be optimal,
all multipliers should be set so that each bidder either spends the entire budget or does not shade the bid.
The choice of the vector of pacing multipliers can be viewed as the equilibrium of a one-shot game in which
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each αi is a best response to all the other αj .1
Our notion of equilibrium only stipulates that pacing multipliers should be optimal given the auction
prices and winning bids, and it is thus not the case that our equilibria are equivalent to Nash equilibria in
the one-shot game. In order to specify what a Nash equilibrium would be we would additionally need to
specify what happens under deviations: a single bidder changing their pacing multiplier could change prices
in auctions they are not winning, thus causing other bidders to exceed their budget. If the game is such that
this budget exhaustion does not cause the budget-exhausted bidder to be dropped from some auctions (and
thus this does not cause reduced prices) then our equilibria constitute Nash equilibria, but if they are dropped
from some auctions then there may be an incentive to cause such dropping in order to reduce prices.
We prove that an equilibrium always exists (which does not follow from existing results due to dis-
continuities when there are ties or when budgets are exceeded) and that a pacing game can admit multiple
equilibria that are not outcome equivalent, which leads to equilibrium selection issues. We compute equi-
libria with respect to commonly-studied objective functions such as social welfare and revenue to provide
insights on the gaps between best and worst equilibria. Then, we study the complexity of finding equilibria,
and provide a mixed-integer program (MIP) to find them. We complement the MIP with best-response and
regret-based dynamics as alternative computational tools for finding equilibria.
As a second motivation beyond real-world use, we show that pacing equilibria are a refinement of
competitive equilibria. A competitive equilibrium consists of item prices and allocations such that each
bidder obtains a bundle that she considers optimal given those prices, and all items with positive prices are
completely allocated. We show that every pacing equilibrium is also a competitive equilibrium. Moreover,
for every competitive equilibrium, it is possible to add some non-winning bidders so that it becomes a pacing
equilibrium. We exhibit an example in which the unique pacing equilibrium is not revenue-minimizing
among competitive equilibria, i.e., there is another competitive equilibrium with lower revenue. This, in
combination with the previous result, implies revenue-nonmonotonicity in the bids, i.e., additional bids can
reduce the revenue of pacing equilibria.
Since there are many unknowns in real-world auction markets (e.g., auction participants, user visits,
resulting prices, event realizations, etc.), practical mechanisms learn the optimal multipliers by dynamically
adjusting them using forecasts of when the budget will run out. In our theoretical model, we sidestep
the issue of dynamically adjusting the multipliers, and consider the limit case in which the auctioneer can
perfectly predict the impressions that will arrive. Although the one-shot game assumes away the stochastic
and dynamic elements, the results we obtain for this limit case have clear implications for real-world auction
markets. To address that, we investigate an adaptive pacing setting, and show that the regret-based adaptive
pacing algorithm of Balseiro and Gur (2019) finds an allocation that is close to the solution of our MIP. Using
realistic instances inspired by auctions on the Internet, we find that the outcome in the adaptive setting can
be improved by seeding the adaptive dynamics with the MIP solution, even though the MIP solves a static
instantiation of the time-varying auctions.
To create realistic instances for computational studies, we sample impressions from real auctions and
generate a bipartite graph that encodes their structure. Subsequently, we cluster the graph to reduce its
size without losing the important competitive information that describes the auction market. The procedure
to create small instances that capture the intricacies of the market and seeding dynamic mechanisms with
the resulting equilibria may pave the road to practical use of pacing equilibria in real-world markets, in
addition to learning optimal multipliers using dynamics. This observation motivated Kroer et al. (2019) to
study, in follow-up work, how to solve simpler representations of dense instances of competitive equilibrium
problems, and how solutions to an approximation differ from the original ones.
Finally, we employ the MIP solution procedure to study incentive compatibility properties of the pacing
1Although in practice the multipliers are computed by the auction market on behalf of the bidders, this can still be viewed as a
game since bidders can in principle change bids themselves to adjust the spending rate and even opt out of the automatic shading.
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mechanism studied here. Generating ground-truth values and budgets for bidders, we compute pacing equi-
libria when they misrepresent their types. Our study provides evidence that incentives to misreport bids and
budgets are weak, provided that there are enough participants in the auctions.
In summary, motivated by the fact that multiplicative pacing mechanisms are widely used in practice
but did not arise from a principled theory, our results contribute evidence that multiplicative pacing is an
appropriate mechanism for managing budgets properly. Equilibrium multipliers are guaranteed to exist and
the MIP we propose can be used to guide equilibrium selection so bidders can jointly maximize their utility
by bidding consistently with their budgets. In addition, according to our computational study, the mechanism
is incentive compatible when auctions have enough participants. We refer the reader to the appendix which
includes additional discussion, missing proofs and further examples.
2 Related work
There is a large literature on casting the budget smoothing problem as an online matching problem rather
than that of running auctions (Mehta et al., 2007; Abrams et al., 2007; Feldman et al., 2010; Devanur et al.,
2011; Bhalgat et al., 2012). This literature was later extended to a stochastic matching setting (Goel and
Mehta, 2008; Devanur and Hayes, 2009; Feldman et al., 2009, 2010; Devanur et al., 2011; Mahdian et al.,
2012; Devanur et al., 2012; Mirrokni et al., 2012). Charles et al. (2013) consider a game-theoretic variant of
this setting. Since these articles consider matching rather than auctions they are not applicable to our setting.
Another line of research considers how individual bidders should optimize their budget spending across
a set of auctions. This has been cast as a form of knapsack problem (Feldman et al., 2007; Borgs et al.,
2007; Zhou et al., 2008), a Markov Decision Process (Amin et al., 2012; Gummadi et al., 2013), constrained
optimization (Zhang et al., 2012, 2014), and optimal control (Xu et al., 2015). A practical implementation
with experiments on LinkedIn advertising data was described by Agarwal et al. 2014.
The closest paper to this one is a groundbreaking paper by Balseiro et al. (2017), which was done inde-
pendently. They define equilibria for a variety of budget management procedures, including multiplicative
pacing, and prove existence. This is related to our existence result later on, although they assume continu-
ous distributions and as a result effectively assume away ties. In contrast, we need to pay special attention
about how ties are broken; specifically, how much of each item goes to each tied bidder. These fractions
are a fundamental part of what constitutes an equilibrium in our setting. (See the model’s description in the
next section for a discussion on how to interpret fractions.) Ties in the bids are not a measure-zero event in
our setting, because pacing parameters will often result in ties even for generic valuations. Balseiro et al.
(2017) introduce an iterative algorithm based on the bidders repeatedly best-responding that is not always
guaranteed to converge to equilibrium and evaluate it in experiments. We show that in our setting such an
algorithm can cycle, give an exact MIP formulation for finding optimal equilibria (also showing that these
problems are NP-hard), and evaluate it in experiments.
Balseiro and Gur (2019) study how an individual bidder might adapt their pacing multiplier over time.
They study a stochastic setting, where each bidder has valuations drawn at each time step independently
of time and the other bidders (though they show that they can also support imperfect correlation between
bidders under certain technical conditions). They design regret-minimizing algorithms for their setting, and
show asymptotic optimality under adversarial and stationary settings. Their setting is different from ours in
that it is dynamic, it requires independence of valuations, and it requires the distribution of valuations to be
absolutely continuous. For these reasons their algorithm is not guaranteed to work in an adaptive variant
of our setting. Nonetheless, we show in our experimental setting that their algorithm can achieve strong
performance when combined with good initial pacing multipliers from solutions to our MIP model.
Balseiro et al. (2015) investigate budget-management in auctions through a fluid mean-field approxima-
tion, which leads to elegant existence results and closed-form descriptions of equilibria in certain settings.
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Figure 2: Two examples of pacing games. Bidders and goods are represented by vertices in a bipartite graph
on the left and right, respectively. The labels on bidder vertices represent budgets, while the labels on edges
denote the bidders’ valuation for the good (missing edges denote null valuations).
Again, this differs from our setting in that they effectively assume away ties by making distributional as-
sumptions on the payments faced by the bidders. That paper and Balseiro et al. (2017) also assume that for
a given impression, the valuation of each bidder is independent from that of other bidders. We require no
such assumption.
Rather than trying to adapt variants of second-price auctions through budget smoothing, one can de-
sign entirely new mechanisms that handle budgets directly (Ashlagi et al., 2010; Bhattacharya et al., 2010;
Dobzinski et al., 2012; Goel et al., 2015b,a). However, for practical purposes we here focus on methods that
implement second-price auctions, as these tend to be preferred in real-world auction markets.
Finally, the relationship between auctions and competitive equilibria has been explored in some other
contexts. Klemperer (2010) uses competitive equilibrium as the allocation mechanism in product-mix auc-
tions. Conversely, auction-based algorithms have been used for arriving at competitive equilibrium in certain
contexts (Garg and Kapoor, 2006; Garg et al., 2004; Kapoor et al., 2007; Nesterov and Shikhman, 2018).
In a follow-up to the present work, Conitzer et al. (2018) show that first-price pacing equilibria can also be
interpreted as competitive equilibria, and in particular they correspond to solutions to the Eisenberg-Gale
convex program in the quasi-linear case (Eisenberg and Gale, 1959; Cole et al., 2017).
3 Pacing Games for Auction Markets
We consider a single-slot auction market in which a set of bidders N = {1, . . . , n} target a set of goods
M = {1, . . . ,m}. Each bidder i has a valuation vij ≥ 0 for each good j, and a budget Bi > 0 to be spent
across all goods. We assume that the goods are sold through independent (single slot) second-price auctions,
and the valuations and budgets are assumed to be known to the auctioneer. Bidders receive a utility equal
to the valuation of the goods for the auctions they win, minus the payments resulting from the auctions. If
their payments exceed their budgets, they are assumed to receive a −∞ utility. To fix ideas, Figure 2 shows
two examples of a pacing game.
The goal is to compute a vector of pacing multipliers that smooths out the spending of each bidder such
that they stay within budget. A pacing multiplier for a bidder i is a real number αi ∈ [0, 1] that is used to
scale down the bids across all auctions: for any i, j, bidder i participates in the auction for good j with a
bid equal to αivij ; we refer to these bids as multiplicatively paced. We call an instance of the above auction
market a pacing game.
The following proposition shows that relying on multiplicative pacing is in the best interest of bidders.
Proposition 1. Suppose we allow arbitrary bids in each auction, i.e., the bids bij are not necessarily multi-
plicatively paced. Then, holding the bids of all other bidders in all auctions fixed, each bidder i has a best
response that is multiplicatively paced (assuming that, when she is tied to win an item, she can choose the
fraction of the item she wins).
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Table 1: Valuations resulting in cycling best responses
i vi,1 vi,2 vi,3 vi,4 vi,5 vi,6
1 100.0 1300.0 123.0 0.0 11.0 0.0
2 0.0 6503.0 300.6 501.0 0.0 25.0
3 50.0 0.0 0.0 500.0 10.0 5.0
Proof. Consider a best response by bidder i consisting of bids bi1, . . . , bim. Let αmaxi = maxj bij/vij , and
without loss of generality suppose αmaxi is minimized among best responses for bidder i. We will show
that bidding b′ij = α
max
i vij is also a best response. Suppose not. Clearly α
max
i ≤ 1 since it never helps
to bid more than one’s valuation. Hence b′ij ≤ vij for all j. Because we have b′ij ≥ bij for all j, i can
only be winning more items, at prices below her valuations. Hence the only way in which the b′ij can fail
to be a better response than the bij is by exceeding i’s budget. Because by assumption i can break ties
as she wishes, it follows that with the b′i she exceeds her budget even if she accepts none of the items for
which she is tied. Because the bij did not exceed the budget, it follows there exists an item j∗ with price
(highest other bid) pj∗ such that bij∗ ≤ pj∗ < b′ij∗ of which i was not winning everything when bidding bi.
Now consider gradually increasing bij∗ towards b′ij∗ (or increasing the fraction of j
∗ that i accepts). If the
bij did not already exhaust the budget, then the moment that i starts winning some of j∗ (at a price below
her valuation), we have found a better response and hence the required contradiction. If the bij did already
exhaust the budget, then once i starts winning some of j∗, we can pay for this by reducing the amount spent
on some item j∗∗ with pj∗∗ = αmaxi vij∗∗ = bij∗∗ . (Such an item must exist by the minimality of α
max
i .) The
utility i receives per dollar spent on j is (vij − pj)/pj = vij/pj − 1. But we have pj∗∗/vij∗∗ = αmaxi and
pj∗/vij∗ < α
max
i . Hence vij∗∗/pj∗∗−1 = 1/αmaxi −1 < vij∗/pj∗ , i.e., the bang-per-buck is actually higher
on j∗. So shifting spending to j∗ is utility-improving, giving us the required contradiction.
To see why we need an assumption on how to break ties, consider the following example.
Example 1 (Ties may make bidders overspend budgets under arbitrary allocations). As depicted on the left
side of Figure 2, assume that v11 = 1, v12 = 1/2, and B1 = 1/2, while v21 = 1/2, v22 = 1/8, and
B2 = ∞. If bidder 1 wins (some of) item 1 with a multiplicatively paced bid, this implies α1 ≥ 1/2, hence
α1v12 ≥ 1/4 > 1/8 so that she wins item 2 as well. But if she does not control what fraction of the items
she wins, a second price auction may charge her as much as 1/2 + 1/8 > B1, resulting in a −∞ utility.
So to be safe she should set αi < 1/2 and lose item 1, resulting in a utility of at most 1/2 − 1/8 = 3/8.
If multiplicative pacing were not used, then she could guarantee utility 1/2 by bidding 1 on item 1 and 0
on item 2, thereby staying in budget. Controlling the fraction she wins of each item, for α1 = 1/2, she can
choose to win 3/4 of item 1 and all of item 2, for a combined valuation of 3/4 + 1/2 = 5/4 and a combined
payment of 3/8 + 1/8 = 1/2 = B1. This results in a utility of 3/4, which is the best possible.
To support the previous argument, it should be noted that if we split each item into many units, a bidder
can in fact control the fractions that she wins when tied by slightly modifying the bids on these units. At
the scale of large Internet auction markets, we can map items to impression types, and units to particular
impressions, which is consistent to the description above. Moreover, in practice, this is likely to happen
automatically because the pacing multiplier fluctuates over time.
The previous result implies that the set of best responses always intersects with the multiplicatively-
paced bid vectors. However, since this is a game, this does not mean that if we sequentially set each bidder’s
bids to a best-responding multiplicatively paced bid, we end up with an equilibrium. The following example
demonstrates that iterating best responses can cycle.
Example 2 (Best responses may cycle). Consider the set of valuations shown in Table 1 and budgets 60,
1300 and∞, for bidders 1 to 3, respectively. All bidders start with a multiplier of 1. Iterating best responses,
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Example: Per−Auction Bids Cycle After Five Iterations
Figure 3: Best-response bids for the cycling example
all multipliers return to 1 after 5 iterations. See Figure 3 for an illustration and Appendix A for a step-by-step
explanation.
Although applying iterated best responses to pacing multipliers can cycle, the example above still admits
multipliers that constitute an equilibrium with the corresponding fractional allocation. But more generally,
does such an equilibrium exist for all instances? Computationally, how hard is it to find one? Before we can
answer these questions, we need to define the notion of equilibrium formally. Intuitively, pacing equilibria
consist of pacing multipliers αi for each bidder i and fractional allocations xij for each bidder-good pair
such that all bidders are either spending their entire budget, or using a pacing multiplier of 1.
Definition 1. A pacing equilibrium is defined by values of pacing multipliers αi ∈ [0, 1] for each bidder,
fractions xij indicating how much of each item j each bidder i receives, and per-unit prices pj , such that:
• For all j, ∑i xij ≤ 1 (with equality if there is at least one i with vij > 0); also, for all i and j,
xij > 0 implies that i’s bid αivij was (possibly tied for) the highest on j.
• If xij > 0, then pj is the highest bid αi′vi′j other than i’s bid.
• For all i, ∑j sij ≤ Bi, where sij is the total spending of bidder i in item j, defined as pjxij . In
addition, if the inequality is strict, then αi = 1.
Our definition of pacing equilibrium does not explicitly require that bidders are best responding. We
show that this property nonetheless follows from our definition:
Proposition 2. For any pacing equilibrium {αi, xij}i∈N,j∈M , the pacing multiplier αi is a best response
for each bidder i ∈ N .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary bidder i ∈ N . We will consider two cases. When αi = 1, bids equal values
for all items. By the properties of the second-price auction, this bidder cannot gain additional utility by
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raising or lowering their bid. When αi < 1, the bidder is guaranteed to be spending their entire budget by
the definition of a pacing equilibrium. Raising αi may cause overspending if additional items are won, in
which case bidder i’s utility will be −∞. Conversely, if bidder i lowers αi, the only thing that can happen
is winning fewer items. Since the bidder is already bidding less than the true valuation, this can only reduce
the utility.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
A pacing equilibrium is not exactly a Nash equilibrium, because it requires not only a profile of strategies
(where the αi would correspond to strategies) but also one of allocations. Even ignoring this issue, there are
discontinuities involved that might be suspected to get in the way of equilibrium existence: upon exceeding
another bid there is a jump in one’s utility, and again for exceeding one’s budget. On top of that, in the
definition of pacing equilibrium, we require bidders to break certain indifferences towards higher bids: a
bidder i who at αi = 1 wins nothing is not allowed to use a lower value of αi in the definition. Nonetheless,
using a smoothed argument we show that a pacing equilibrium always exists.
Theorem 1. Any pacing game admits a pacing equilibrium.
The smoothed argument relies on a smoothed version of the pacing game, which takes care of all the
discontinuity issues. In the smoothed version, the allocation varies continuously and is determined as a
function of the αi only, the penalty for exceeding one’s budget varies continuously, and strict incentive is
given to bid higher. We show we can apply a pure Nash equilibrium existence result to such games. We then
show that if we take a sequence of such games that converges to a (non-smoothed) pacing game, then this
sequence of pure Nash equilibria converges to a pacing equilibrium.
Definition 2. For  > 0 andH > 0, an (,H)-smoothed pacing game is a game where the set of pure strate-
gies for each bidder i is the set of pacing multipliers αi ∈ [0, 1]. For a fixed choice of pacing multipliers,
the original pacing auction market is modified as follows in order to compute allocations and payments:
• Reserve bid: there is an artificial bid of 2 on all items (treated as one of the bidders in the below).
• Allocation and pricing rule: For every item j, consider the highest bid b∗j = maxi αivij . Let
Sj = {i : αivij ≥ b∗j − } be the set of bidders close to the maximum bid for j. Then i ∈ Sj wins the
following fraction of item j: xij =
αivij−(b∗j−)∑
i′∈S [αivij−(b∗j−)] , and pays sij = xijpj for this, where pj is the
highest bid on j among bidders other than i, minus  (which is necessarily at most b∗j − ). For the
other bidders, xij = sij = 0.
• Additional artificial spend (to encourage higher bids from those who have not spent their bud-
gets): Each bidder will additionally receive a quantity αi of an artificial good (with unlimited supply)
worth 2 per unit to her, and pay αi for this. This results in a profit of αi if the budget is not exceeded
by this payment.
• Utility: The utility of bidder i is (Bi − αi−
∑
j sij) + 2αi+
∑
j xijvij if she does not exceed the
budget Bi, or H(Bi − αi−
∑
j sij) + 2αi+
∑
j xijvij if she exceeds it.
The smoothing of allocations and payments allows us to apply existence theorems about pure-strategy
Nash equilibria.
Theorem 2. Consider a smoothed pacing game in which a strategy for bidder i consists of choosing αi ∈
[0, 1]. Also, let M be any upper bound on the sum of a bidder’s valuations in the game, including those for
the artificial good. For H > M/, the game admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. We will apply a theorem by Debreu (1952), Glicksberg (1952), and Fan (1952) (see also Ozdaglar
2010, p. 20) that guarantees existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium under the following conditions
(which we immediately show apply to our game):
• Compact and convex strategy space. This holds because αi ∈ [0, 1].
• Continuity of utility in all strategies. This holds for the following reasons: xij and sij are continuous
in all the αi′ (in particular, note that bidders i who are just barely in Sj with αivij = b∗j −  receive
xij = 0). And utility is continuous in these quantities (in particular, note that the expressions for
bidders who exceed and do not exceed the budget coincide at 2αi +
∑
j xijvij when the budget is
spent exactly).
• Quasiconcavity of utility in the bidder’s own strategy. This means we must show that ui(αi, α−i) is
quasiconcave in αi. This is the case if there exists a number t such that for αi < t, ui is nondecreasing
in αi, and for αi > t, ui is nonincreasing in αi. Bidder i’s total spend αi+
∑
j sij is increasing and
continuous in αi. Holding α−i fixed, let t be the value of αi such that αi+
∑
j sij = Bi (if no such
value exists we may set t = 1). Then, for αi < t, ui is increasing in αi, because increasing αi results
in winning more items (including more of the artificial good) at prices below i’s valuation (αi does
not affect pj , and if i is winning part of j then vij ≥ αvij ≥ b∗j −  ≥ pj). For αi > t, i’s total spend
(including on the artificial good) is increasing in αi, and any additional spend will exceed i’s budget,
decreasing the utility termH(B−αi−
∑
j sij) at rateH . Because each item (including the artificial
good) costs at least 2−  = , the value gained from items bought increases at a rate of at most M/,
which by assumption is smaller. Hence, utility is decreasing in αi when αi > t.
With this result we are ready to prove Theorem 1. Using the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria
in smoothed pacing games, we can show that a limit point of decreasingly smoothed games constitutes a
pacing equilibrium in the original pacing game.
Proof. For a given pacing game, consider a sequence of smoothed versions of it, defined by (l, H l), sat-
isfying H l > M/l, liml→∞ l = 0, and liml→∞H l = ∞. Consider an associated sequence of equilibria
of these games (guaranteed to exist by Theorem 2) defined by {αli, xlij , plj , slij}. This sequence must have
a subsequence with a limit point {α∗i , x∗ij , p∗j , s∗ij} by virtue of the fact that these numbers lie in a compact
space (the values provide an upper bound on the payments); replace the sequence by this subsequence. We
will show that this limit point is an equilibrium of the original pacing game, via the following claims.
• The allocation is feasible. Since for each l and j,∑i xlij ≤ 1, we must have∑i x∗ij ≤ 1. Moreover,
suppose that there exists i with vij > 0. Because Bi > 0, there is some positive value of αi that
guarantees i stays below budget; hence i will bid at least αivij for every l. Thus, for sufficiently
large l, l will be sufficiently small that the reserve bidder wins none of j, and
∑
i′ x
l
i′j = 1. Hence∑
i′ x
∗
i′j = 1 in this case. Finally, if x
∗
ij > 0, this implies that there exists L such that for l > L,
αlivij ≥ maxi′ αli′vi′j − l. Since liml→∞ l = 0 this implies α∗i vij ≥ maxi′ α∗i′vi′j , so i in fact is at
least tied for the highest bid on j.
• The payments are right. p∗j = liml→∞ plj . The latter is the highest other bid minus l. The highest
other bid converges to the highest other bid at the limit point (note the reserve bid goes to 0), and l
goes to 0. Moreover, s∗ij = liml→∞ x
l
ijp
l
j = x
∗
ijp
∗
j .
• No bidder exceeds her budget. We must show that for each bidder i, ∑j s∗ij ≤ Bi. Suppose not.
Then, there exists δ > 0 such that for any L, we can find l > L with
∑
j s
l
ij ≥ Bi + δ. But if we
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let L be such that for l > L, we have H l > M/δ, then the bidder’s utility for the equilibrium of the
resulting game l is at most M − δH l < M −M = 0. (Spending on the artificial good only makes
things worse.) But the bidder can guarantee herself utility 0 by setting αli = 0, contradicting the fact
that we have an equilibrium. Hence no bidder exceeds her budget.
• A bidder with α∗i < 1 spends her entire budget. Suppose not, i.e., there is such a bidder with∑
j s
∗
ij < Bi. Then we can find L such that for l > L, both α
l
i
l +
∑
j s
l
ij < Bi (because 
l goes to
0) and αli < 1. But as we pointed out earlier, for such a bidder utility is strictly increasing in α
l
i (the
strictness is due to the artificial good). Thus this bidder is not best-responding, contradicting the fact
that we have an equilibrium. Hence a bidder with α∗i < 1 spends her entire budget.
Knowing that at least one pacing equilibrium exists, we ask the following questions. First, can pacing
equilibria be very sensitive to input parameters? Second, can a pacing game admit multiple pacing equilibria,
and if so, can they differ significantly from each other? We provide affirmative answers in each case. For
this, we need to quantify how different one equilibrium is from another. Hence, we study these questions
for objectives that capture measures of interest.
Definition 3. For a feasible solution to a pacing game: Revenue is the total spending in the game (
∑
ij sij),
social welfare is the sum of winning valuations (
∑
ij xijvij), and paced welfare is the sum of paced winning
valuations (
∑
ij xijαivij).
Revenue and social welfare are natural objectives; we now justify why we consider paced welfare. If
bidders’ budgets are small, then their valuations are relevant only insofar as they indicate the relative values
of the items. But they no longer make sense as an absolute dollar figure: if one were to double all the
valuations, without touching the budget, nothing would change in the auctions. The next observation makes
this precise.
Observation 1. Given a pacing equilibrium where αi < 1 for some i, if we modify all of i’s valuations to
v′ij = βivij where βi ≥ αi, then we can retain the original pacing equilibrium by setting α′i = αi/βi. We
call this an irrelevant shift in valuations.
This leads us to a definition and a corresponding result.
Definition 4. A welfare measure is robust to irrelevant shifts in valuations if it produces the same value after
an irrelevant shift in valuations. A welfare measure coincides with social welfare when budgets are large if,
whenever αi = 1 for all bidders i, it evaluates to
∑
ij xijvij .
Proposition 3. Paced welfare is the unique welfare measure that coincides with social welfare when budgets
are large and is robust to irrelevant shifts in valuations.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that paced welfare satisfies the conditions. To show that it does so
uniquely, consider any welfare measure satisfying the two conditions and any feasible solution of a pacing
game. We prove that the welfare measure must coincide with paced welfare, by induction on the number of
agents i with αi < 1. If there are 0 such agents, then this follows from the fact that the measure coincides
with social welfare in this case. Suppose we have shown it to be true with k such agents; we will show it
with k + 1. Choose an arbitrary agent i with αi < 1. Modify the agent’s valuations to v′ij = αivij , and let
α′i = αi/αi = 1. This is an irrelevant shift in valuations, so the modification affects neither paced welfare
nor the welfare measure under consideration. But by the induction assumption, the two must coincide after
the shift. So they must have coincided before the shift as well.
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Equipped with these definitions, we see that equilibria are sensitive to budgets. In particular, budget
perturbations can cause large paced welfare or revenue loss, as we show in the following examples.
Example 3 (Large paced welfare loss from small changes in budgets). Bidder 1 has valuation v11 = 100
and budget B1 = 1.01. Bidder 2 has valuation v21 = 1 and budget B2 = ∞. Then we have a pacing
equilibrium with α1 = α2 = 1 where 1 wins all of item 1 for a paced welfare of 100. Moreover this is the
unique pacing equilibrium because neither bidder can spend her whole budget. Now, reduce B1 to 0.99. We
must still have α2 = 1. Hence, we must have α1 ≤ 0.01, because otherwise 1 will exceed her budget on
item 1. As a result, paced welfare is at most 1.
Example 4 (Large revenue loss from small changes in budgets). Bidder 1 has valuations v11 = 100 and
v12 = 100, and budget B1 = 1.01. Bidder 2 has valuations v21 = 1 and v22 = 101, and budget B2 = ∞.
Then we have a pacing equilibrium with α1 = α2 = 1 where 1 wins all of item 1 at price 1 and 2 wins all
of item 2 at price 100, for a total revenue of 101. Moreover this is the unique pacing equilibrium: bidder 2
cannot possibly spend his whole budget and hence must have α2 = 1, and given this, bidder 1 cannot win
any of item 2 and will spend less than her whole budget on item 1, so that α1 = 1 as well. Now, reduce B1
to 0.99. We still must have α2 = 1. Hence, we must have α1 ≤ 0.01, because otherwise 1 will exceed her
budget on item 1. As a result, revenue from each item is at most 1, for a total revenue of at most 2.
Next, we show examples that admit multiple pacing equilibria, between which there are large revenue,
welfare, and paced welfare gaps.
Example 5 (Two equilibria with large revenue difference). Let v11 = v22 = 100, v12 = v21 = 1, v13 =
v23 = 99, and v14 = v34 = 100. Let all other valuations be 0. Moreover, let bidders 1 and 2 have budget
1 each, and let bidder 3 have budget 100. One pacing equilibrium is α1 = 1, α2 = 0.01, α3 = 1, where
bidder 1 wins item 1 for 0.01 and item 3 for 0.99, bidder 2 wins item 2 for 1, and bidder 3 wins item 4 for
100, resulting in a total revenue of 102. Another pacing equilibrium is α1 = 0.01, α2 = 1, α3 = 1, where
bidder 1 wins item 1 for 1, bidder 2 wins item 2 for 0.01 and item 3 for 0.99, and bidder 3 wins item 4 for 1,
resulting in a total revenue of 3.
Example 6 (Two equilibria with large welfare difference). Let v11 = 100, v22 = 200, v12 = 2, v21 = 1,
v13 = v23 = 99, v14 = 0.01, v24 = 1, and v34 = 10000. Let all other valuations be 0. Moreover, let
B1 = 1, B2 = 2, and B3 = 0.01. One pacing equilibrium is α1 = 1, α2 = 0.01, α3 = 1, where bidder
1 wins item 1 for 0.01 and item 3 for 0.99, bidder 2 wins item 2 for 2, and bidder 3 wins item 4 for 0.01,
resulting in a total social welfare of 10399. Another pacing equilibrium is α1 = 0.01, α2 = 1, α3 = 0.0001,
where bidder 1 wins item 1 for 1; bidder 2 wins item 2 for 0.02, item 3 for 0.99, and a fraction 0.99 of item 4
at 0.99; and bidder 4 wins a fraction 0.01 of item 4 at 0.01. This results in a total social welfare of 499.99.
Example 7 (Two equilibria with large paced welfare difference). Let v11 = v22 = 100, v12 = v21 = 1,
v13 = v23 = 99, v14 = 10000, and v24 = 0. Moreover, let bidders 1 and 2 have budget 1 each. One pacing
equilibrium is α1 = 1, α2 = 0.01, where bidder 1 wins item 1 for 0.01, item 3 for 0.99, and item 4 for 0, and
bidder 2 wins item 2 for 1, resulting in a total paced welfare of 100 + 99 + 10000 + 1 = 10200. Another
pacing equilibrium is α1 = 0.01, α2 = 1, where bidder 1 wins item 1 for 1 and item 4 for 0, and bidder 2
wins item 2 for 0.01 and item 3 for 0.99, resulting in a total paced welfare of 1 + 100 + 100 + 99 = 300.
We highlight that while we showed examples where equilibria have very different objective values, this
may not be necessarily the case for realistic instances. We later investigate how often this happens solving
for equilibria for a set of simulated instances. The last results suggest that in practice it may be worthwhile
to consider equilibrium selection procedures. While we do not explicitly consider equilibrium selection in
the dynamic case, reaching a desirable equilibrium may necessitate designing the dynamics carefully or to
fine tune the initialization of pacing multipliers.
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Finally, note that pacing equilibria are specified for games between proxy bidders, assuming the adver-
tiser truthfully reports its values and budgets. In reality, an advertiser may be better off misreporting in order
for proxy bidders to reach an equilibrium that results in higher utility for that advertiser. The following ex-
ample shows that, for some instances, an advertiser can achieve a large gain in utility through a small change
in reported values. In Section 8, we will empirically investigate incentives for advertisers to misreport, and
show that they do not create large incentive issues in practice if auctions are thick.
Example 8 (Large utility gain when slightly misreporting values). Bidder 1 has valuations v11 = 100 and
v12 = 100, and budget B1 = 0.99. Bidder 2 has valuations v21 = 0.98 and v22 = 101, and budget
B2 =∞. Then we have a pacing equilibrium with α1 = α2 = 1, where bidder 1 wins all of item 1 at price
0.98 and Bidder 2 wins all of item 2 at price 100. Bidder 2’s utility for this outcome is 101− 100 = 1.
Moreover this is the unique pacing equilibrium: bidder 2 cannot possibly spend his whole budget and
hence must have α2 = 1, and given this, bidder 1 cannot win any of item 2 and will spend less than her
whole budget on item 1, so that α1 = 1 as well. Now, increase the reported v21 to 1. We still must have
α2 = 1, since bidder 2 has infinite budget. Hence, we must have α1 ≤ 0.01, because otherwise bidder
1 will exceed her budget on item 1. As a result, bidder 2 wins all of item 2, receiving value 101 at a
price no larger than 1; bidder 2 also wins some of item 1, receiving nonnegative value and cost at most 1.
Bidder 2’s utility for this outcome is at least 99.
5 Relationship to Competitive Equilibrium
We now show that pacing equilibria are a refinement of competitive (Walrasian) equilibria, a widely studied
concept for understanding markets. These results are in contrast to those for stochastically-smoothed settings
in Balseiro et al. (2017) and Balseiro and Gur (2019), which do not have a such a relationship to competitive
equilibria. We define a competitive equilibrium with budgets as follows.
Definition 5. A competitive equilibrium with budgets consists of a price pj on every item j, and an alloca-
tion of items to bidders such that every bidder buys a bundle that maximizes her utility, subject to her budget
constraint. (A bidder is allowed to acquire items partially.) That is, bidder i’s bundle, consisting of fractions
{xij} that she obtains of each item j, must be in arg max{xij :∑j xijpj≤Bi}{∑j xij(vij − pj)}. Additionally,
every item with a positive price must be fully allocated.
We can characterize the optimal actions of buyers as selecting items in decreasing order of bang-per-
buck. This will be helpful in the derivations below.
Proposition 4. A bundle maximizes a buyer’s utility under her budget constraint if and only if she buys
(parts of) items in decreasing order of bang-per-buck (vij/pj), starting with the highest, until she either
runs out of budget or reaches items such that vij < pj .
Proposition 5. For every pacing equilibrium, there is an equivalent competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Given the pacing equilibrium, set the price of each item equal to the second-highest paced bid on
it (possibly equal to the highest bid), and use the same allocation as in the pacing equilibrium. Note this
means agents also pay the same as in the pacing equilibrium. Every agent i that does not run out of budget
(and therefore has multiplier αi = 1) buys every item j with vij > pj , because the valuation being above
the price means that agent was uniquely the highest bidder on it in the pacing equilibrium; and buys no item
j with vij < pj , because the valuation being below the price means that the agent was not a highest bidder
for it. Similarly, an agent that does run out of budget is spending her money on maximum bang-per-buck
items, because she buys the items for which αivij > pj ⇐⇒ vijpj > 1αi ≥ 1 (and possibly some of those for
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which αivij = pj ⇐⇒ vijpj = 1αi ≥ 1). Nobody buys anything that is priced above her valuation, because
the price being above her valuation means that she did not have the highest (paced) bid on that item in the
pacing equilibrium.
The converse is not true: pacing equilibria strictly refine competitive equilibria. For example, consider
a setting with a single bidder and item, with value v11 = 1. All pacing equilibria have zero revenue, but a
competitive equilibrium can have p1 = 12 . Hence, a competitive equilibrium can result in higher revenue
than any pacing equilibrium. The opposite direction is more interesting: a competitive equilibrium can yield
a lower revenue than any pacing equilibrium. The intuition is that setting a high price on one item can drain
some bidder’s budget, thereby making that bidder effectively “paced,” as shown below.
Example 9 (Competitive equilibrium with more revenue than pacing equilibrium). Suppose we have 3 bid-
ders and 3 items. Bidder 1 values item 1 at 101, bidder 2 values items 1, 2 and 3 at 100, 200, and 10,
respectively, and bidder 3 values item 3 at 1. All other valuations are 0. Bidder 2 has budget 10.1, the other
two have budget∞. Since bidder 2 faces no competition for item 2, in a pacing equilibrium, bidder 2 gets
it for free and will pay at most 1. Hence, no bidder will be paced, resulting in independent second-price
auctions. The revenue for item 1 is 100. However, in a competitive equilibrium, we can arbitrarily set a
price of 10 for item 2. We then price item 3 at 1 and let bidder 2 buy one tenth of it, thereby spending
his budget. Finally, we price item 1 at 101 so bidder 2 will no longer want to buy it. (For bidder 2, the
items ordered by bang per buck are 2, 3 and 1, which satisfies the competitive equilibrium conditions.)
Revenue has plummeted to 11 + 10 + 1 = 22.
Nonetheless, every competitive equilibrium can be reinterpreted as a pacing equilibrium as well.
Proposition 6. For every competitive equilibrium, one can construct an equivalent pacing equilibrium after
possibly adding a single bidder who acts as a price setter but who does not win anything.
Proof. Given the competitive equilibrium, add a bidder with infinite budget who bids exactly pj (as in the
competitive equilibrium) on every item. Use the same allocation as in the competitive equilibrium (so the
new bidder wins nothing). Bidders who bought every item for which their valuations exceeded the price
are not paced. Bidders who ran out of budget are paced as follows. Since they bought items in order of
maximum bang-per-buck, for each such bidder i, consider the item j with minimum vijpj of which she still
bought some. Define αi = pj/vij for that item.
We must show that every item is in fact won by the highest paced bidder for it and that the added bidder
is always the second highest (allowing for ties). First, we show that the added bidder is never the uniquely
highest bid, because its bids are always (weakly) exceeded by any bidder who wins (some of) the item in
the competitive equilibrium. If that bidder is an unpaced bidder, we must have vij ≥ pj , because otherwise
she would not have bought the item in the competitive equilibrium. If it is a paced bidder, because she buys
some of j in the competitive equilibrium, it follows that vijpj ≥ 1αi by the definition of αi. Then, αivij ≥ pj .
Next, we show that there cannot be two or more bidders with paced bids strictly higher than that of the
added bidder. For suppose there are; there is at least one that will not win the entire item. If that bidder is
not paced, then we have vij > pj , but this leads to a contradiction because unpaced bidders must have won
all such items completely in the competitive equilibrium. If the bidder is paced, we have αivij > pj ⇐⇒
vij
pj
> 1αi . By the definition of αi that means there is some other item j
′ with vij′
p′j
= 1αi <
vij
pj
of which i
bought some in the competitive equilibrium. But this leads to a contradiction, because if so, then i should
have bought all of j in the competitive equilibrium before moving on to j′.
It follows that every bidder winning part of an item has the highest paced bid on that item and the added
bidder is always (possibly tied for) second. This means that the allocation and prices are consistent with the
definition of pacing equilibrium.
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Combining Example 9 with Proposition 6, we obtain a revenue nonmonotonicity result.
Corollary 1. Adding a bidder may decrease the revenue at a pacing equilibrium.
Finally, the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that competitive equilibria are Pareto
optimal. Although this is a known result, we include a direct proof for our setting in the appendix. This,
together with Proposition 5, implies that pacing equilibria are Pareto optimal as well.
Proposition 7. Any pacing equilibrium is Pareto optimal (when considering the utilities of both the seller
and bidders).
6 Computing Pacing Equilibria
Motivated by equilibrium existence, and having defined the relevant objectives, we investigate the complex-
ity of computing an equilibrium that optimizes an objective. (We leave open the complexity of identifying
an arbitrary equilibrium.) Using a pacing equilibrium gadget that captures binary variables, we can reduce
3SAT to our problem. An instance of 3SAT consists of a tuple (V,C), where V is a set of Boolean vari-
ables, and C is a set of clauses of the form (l1 ∨ l2 ∨ l3) with li representing literals. We define the decision
versions of our problems and show hardness results for them.
Definition 6. We are given items, bidders, bidders’ valuations for items, bidders’ budgets, and a number T .
MAX-REVENUE-PACING consists in deciding whether there exists a pacing equilibrium that achieves
revenue at least T . MAX-WELFARE-PACING and MAX-PACED-WELFARE-PACING are similar
but for social welfare, and paced social welfare, respectively.
Theorem 3. MAX-REVENUE-PACING, MAX-WELFARE-PACING and MAX-PACED-WELFARE-
PACING are NP-complete.
While full proofs are deferred to the appendix because they are technical, we provide the intuition for
the proof here. To get the results, we rely on Example 10, given below. This is an auction-market instance
that models binary decisions. We use one instance for each variable, with both bidders representing literals
true and false. Given a 3SAT instance, we construct an auction market in which additional bidders and the
objectives encode whether all clauses are satisfied.
Example 10 (Gadget for binary decisions). Given K1 > 0, α > 0, δ ≥ 0 (with α+ δ < 1), and small , let
K2 =
1−α−δ
2α K1. Let v11 = v12 = v21 = v22 = K2, v23 = v14 = K1, and v13 = v24 = K1/α + . Both
bidders have budget K1. One pacing equilibrium is α1 = 1, α2 = α. This results in bidder 1 winning items
1, 2, and 3, for a total price of 2αK2 + αK1 = (1− α− δ)K1 + αK1 = (1− δ)K1, and bidder 2 winning
item 4 for a total price of K1. By symmetry, there is another equilibrium with α1 = α, α2 = 1, in which
bidder 2 retains δK1 of his budget.
For small α and δ, this instance does not admit a pacing equilibrium where both bidders have even a
moderately high multiplier. Hence, if we were interested in pacing equilibria with high multipliers, we can
choose to make either α1 or α2 as high as possible, but we cannot attempt to make both of them somewhat
high at the same time.
These hardness results limit the performance that we may expect from simple dynamics. Hence, it
may be worthwhile to attempt to intelligently guide the dynamics to improve the chances of ending up at a
desirable equilibrium.
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7 MIP Formulation of Pacing Equilibria
Even though in earlier sections we showed that computing equilibria is hard in the worst case, this does not
mean that it is a hard problem in practice and for specific instances. Being able to compute equilibria will
allow us to study their properties (e.g., find gaps among multiple equilibria, study incentive compatibility),
and to use them as initial solutions when learning pacing multipliers in dynamic settings. We provide a MIP
formulation in which the constraints are equivalent to the equilibrium conditions. This guarantees that a so-
lution is feasible if and only if it satisfies the conditions given in Definition 1. By optimizing with respect to
various objectives, we can refine the solution procedure and find different equilibria. To define the problem,
it will be convenient to let v¯j = maxi∈N vi,j be the maximum value for good j for any bidder. We will need
the following variables:
• αi ∈ [0, 1] : Bidder i’s pacing multiplier.
• sij ∈ R+ : Bidder i’s spend on good j.
• pj ∈ R+ : Price of good j.
• hj ∈ R+ : The highest bid for good j.
• dij ∈ {0, 1} : 1 if bidder i may win any part of good j.
• yi ∈ {0, 1} : 1 if bidder i spends its full budget.
• wij ∈ {0, 1} : 1 if bidder i is the winner of good j.
• rij ∈ {0, 1} : 1 if bidder i is the second price for good j.
Most variables are self-explanatory, as they denote the same as in the pacing-game definition. Variables
wij , and rij represent a bidder that is considered the winner and a bidder that is considered the runner up
because the bid was a second price, respectively, for each item j. The winner does not participate in lower-
bounding the price (constraint (9)), and the runner up upper bounds the price (constraint (10)). In both cases,
ties are broken arbitrarily but only one bidder can be chosen. Although there could be multiple winners and
runner-ups, selecting exactly one of them is useful to encode the rules of a second price auction.
The equilibria of the pacing game are given exactly by the feasible solutions to the following MIP. From
a feasible solution, we get pacing multipliers αi for each bidder and spendings sij for each bidder-good pair.
The fraction of good j allocated to bidder i can then be computed as xij = sij/pj . (This last computation
is not done inside the MIP because it would be nonlinear, but it is an easy computation to do once a solution
to the MIP is obtained.)∑
j∈M
sij ≤ Bi (∀i∈N) (1)∑
j∈M
sij ≥ yiBi (∀i∈N) (2)
αi ≥ 1− yi (∀i∈N) (3)∑
i∈N
sij = pj (∀j∈M) (4)
sij ≤ Bidij (∀i∈N, j∈M) (5)
hj ≥ αivij (∀i∈N, j∈M) (6)
hj ≤ αivij + (1− dij)v¯j (∀i∈N, j∈M) (7)
wij ≤ dij (∀i∈N, j∈M) (8)
pj ≥ αivij − wijvij (∀i∈N, j∈M) (9)
pj ≤ αivij + (1− rij)v¯j (∀i∈N, j∈M) (10)∑
i∈N
wij = 1 (∀j∈M) (11)∑
i∈N
rij = 1 (∀j∈M) (12)
rij + wij ≤ 1 (∀i∈N, j∈M) (13)
We now describe the constraints. Constraint (1) ensures that a bidder can spend no more than its budget,
while (2) ensures that a bidder’s total spend must be at least as large as its budget if that bidder is spending
its full budget (this enforces the definition of yi). Constraint (3) ensures that a bidder must have a pacing
multiplier of at least 1 if it does not spend its full budget, (4) ensures that the total spend of a good across
bidders must equal the price of that good, and (5) ensures that a bidder’s spend on a good is no greater than
0 if it did not win part of that good. Constraint (6) ensures that the highest bid for a good must be at least as
high as every paced bid for that good, and (7) ensures that the highest bid for a good must be no greater than
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the paced bid of every bidder that wins part of that good. Constraint (8) ensures that the designated winner
for a good is designated as allowed to win a partial amount of that good, and (9) ensures that the price for a
good is at least as high as all paced bids besides the designated winner’s paced bid. Constraint (10) ensures
that the price for a good is no greater than the runner-up’s paced bid, (11) ensures that there is exactly one
designated winner, (12) ensures that there is exactly one designated runner-up, and (13) ensures that a bidder
cannot be both the designated winner and the designated runner-up of a given auction.
A revenue-maximizing pacing equilibrium can be computed by maximizing
∑
j∈M pj in the feasible
region defined above, whereas one can use max
∑
j∈M hj to maximize the sum of the winning paced bids.
We show in the appendix that our MIP correctly computes a pacing equilibrium.
Proposition 8. A solution to the MIP (1)-(13) is feasible if and only if it corresponds to the conditions of a
pacing equilibrium.
If we are not concerned with a particular objective, but instead just want to compute any one pacing
equilibrium, we can use the following two approaches: The first is to simply run the original MIP as a
feasibility problem with no objective. The second is to relax the complementarity condition (3). We in-
troduce a variable zi for each bidder i that represents whether that bidder satisfies (3). We replace (3) by
αi ≥ 1 − yi − zi(∀i ∈ N). If zi = 1, then this constraint is no longer active since αi ≥ 0 ≥ −yi is
implied by the nonnegativity of αi and yi. If z0 = 0 then this constraint is our standard complementarity
condition on αi and yi. We can then solve this relaxed MIP with the objective
∑
i∈N zi. A solution where
the objective is zero corresponds to a feasible solution to the original MIP.
8 Computational Experiments
In this section, we revisit our analytical results from an empirical point of view and put those results in
perspective through a computational study. Rather than investigating worst-case instances as before, we
consider various distributions over pacing instances that attempt to capture real-life phenomena. We inves-
tigate the following questions.
MIP Scalability. How large are the instances that the MIP can solve? We formulated a MIP to compute
the value-maximizing pacing equilibria, but the problem of computing the value-maximizing pacing
equilibrium is NP-complete.
Equilibrium Analysis. What are the empirical properties of pacing equilibria? We showed that pacing
equilibria are guaranteed to exist, but they are not necessarily unique, and there can be large gaps
between the highest- and lowest-valued equilibria with respect to revenue, welfare, and paced welfare.
Incentive Compatibility. Does the system provide the right incentives? The pacing system takes advertis-
ers’ reported values as input. While an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for those values, we showed
that a bidder can sometimes increase their utility by misreporting their values. This calls for a deeper
study of the welfare properties of pacing equilibria to understand when input values are truthful.
A Dynamic Setup. How can our analytical results lead to improvements of practical pacing algorithms?
We study a static game but our framework can inform how one paces budgets in a dynamic setting
with noisy realizations of impressions.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Section 8.1, we describe the different classes of
problem instances we construct. In Section 8.2, we describe how well the MIP scales on these different in-
stances. Section 8.3 describes equilibrium properties: empirical gaps between equilibria, and incentives for
advertisers to misreport bids and budgets. Section 8.4 explores using the MIP to seed a heuristic algorithm
for a dynamic setup of the problem.
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8.1 Problem Instances
We run experiments on two types of problem instances: stylized instances, which were generated from a
distribution over bipartite graphs; and realistic instances, for which a bipartite graph was constructed from
real-world auction markets. We describe how each type of instance is constructed below. Recall that a
pacing instance consists of a tuple (n,m, (vij)i∈N,j∈M , (Bi)i∈N ), where n is the number of bidders, m is
the number of goods (we use ‘auctions’ interchangeably), vij is bidder i’s value for winning good j, and Bi
is bidder i’s budget. We denote N = {1, . . . , n} and similarly with M and m.
Stylized Instances For stylized instances, we consider three distributions over bipartite graphs: complete,
sampled, and correlated. They refer to how the graph is connected and the correlation between edge weights.
Complete. In complete graph instances, every bidder is interested in every good. For each bidder i and
good j, the valuation vij is drawn uniformly iid from [0, 1]. For each bidder i, its budget Bi is drawn
uniformly from [0,
∑m
j=1 vij/n].
Sampled. Sampled graph instances are generated similarly to complete graphs, except that bidders are
interested in a subset of goods. For each good, a subset of interested bidders is sampled uniformly
at random from the power set of {1, . . . , n}. If a bidder happens to not be interested in any goods, a
single good of interest is uniformly sampled for that bidder. Valuations vij for the resulting edges and
budgets Bi are generated in the same manner as for complete graph instances.
Correlated. Correlated graphs are similar to sampled graphs, except that, for each good, the valuations are
correlated across bidders through the additional parameter σ. For each good j, an expected valuation
µj is drawn uniformly at random from [0, 1]. For each bidder-good pair, valuation vij is then sampled
from a Gaussian distribution truncated to [0, 1] with mean µj and standard deviation σ.
We generated 5 stylized instances for all combinations of instance type∈ {complete, sampled, correlated},
numbers of bidders n ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}, number of goods m ∈ {4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14}, and in the case of
correlated instances, standard deviations σ ∈ {0.01, . . . , 0.09, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3}. This resulted in a total of 175
complete instances, 175 sampled instances, and 2100 correlated instances, totalling 2450 stylized instances.
Realistic Instances We construct realistic instances from real-world auction markets in two steps. We first
take all bidding data for a country in a one-hour interval and use it to create n bidders and m goods. For that
data, we identify the n bidders that participate in the most auctions. (Here, ‘auctions’ refer to the data while
‘goods’ refer to the generated instance.) Each of those bidders maps to a bidder in the generated instance.
For now, we define the goods in the instance as the auctions that include at least one of the n bidders. We
set the bid in each bidder-auction pair to be the value of the bidder for the corresponding good. The budget
for each bidder was set to the bidder’s original budget multiplied by a single scalar, calibrated to get the
percentage of budget-constrained bidders equal to what was observed in the real-world auction market.
These instances were too large for the MIP to solve. In a second step, we reduce the size through
clustering: we apply the k-means algorithm to the goods generated so far, using the n-dimensional vector
of values for that good as features. The goods in the resulting instance were the resulting clusters. Each
bidder valuation for a (cluster-level) good is set to the sum of valuations among goods in the cluster. To
generate the final bidder budgets, we execute the clustering algorithm for k = 8 and choose a single factor
to scale the budget such that the paced-welfare-maximizing pacing equilibrium had the same fraction of
budget-constrained bidders as that of the original auction market. Finally, we run the clustering algorithm
again and generate the required m clusters.
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Figure 4: Percentage of stylized instances solved within 5 minutes by objective and graph size
For the computational experiments, we preselected 50 country-hour pairs from 26 unique countries, and
used n = 10. In each case, we generated scaled-down instances for 8 to 15 clusters, for a total of 450
realistic instances.
8.2 MIP Scalability
We start by exploring the size of instances one can solve with the MIP. It is evident that the MIP will not
scale to the size of real-world pacing instances, which may involve tens of billions of auctions in a single
day. However, less clear is how long it takes to solve instances of different size, and whether some structure
in problem instances or MIP objectives were harder to solve than others. The larger the instances that the
MIP can solve, the better equipped we are to use the MIP to answer other empirical questions.
The high-level experimental setup is: (1) We generated the 2450 stylized and 450 realistic instances
mentioned earlier. (2) We solved each instance using different versions of the MIP. (3) We computed the
fraction of instances that were optimally solved, broken down by solution method and instance features.
We considered several versions of the MIP, which we name within parenthesis: the pure feasibility
MIP as defined by (1)-(13) (feasibility), the MIP with the relaxed version of (3) (relaxed feasibility), and
the feasibility MIP with objectives that minimize or maximize revenue or paced welfare (min revenue, max
revenue, min paced welfare, max paced welfare, respectively). All computations were done with a time limit
of 5 minutes using Xpress Optimization Suite 8.0 FICO (2016) on a server with 24 single-core Intel Haswell
CPUs running at 2.5GHz and 60GB of RAM. We used default parameters and cuts to solve the problems.
The relatively short timeout allowed us to run the study for our extensive set of instances. Solutions were
programmatically checked to make sure they satisfy the pacing equilibrium conditions.
Results We report the percentage of instances for which equilibria were found (as opposed to timing out)
and report results by three breakdowns: MIP objective, number of goods m, and number of bidders n.
Figure 4 shows how runtimes scale on stylized instances for each breakdown. We observe that complete
graph instances are harder to solve than sampled or correlated instances. This is not surprising, since they
require more decision variables than the other two types. The instance type played a larger factor in whether
an instance was solved than did the objective type. Still, we observe some differences between objective
types. Across all three sets of stylized instance distributions, the value-maximizing MIP objectives were
solved more often than value-minimizing objectives. Paced welfare objectives were solved slightly more
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Objective Instances Pairs % No Gap % Max Gap
Revenue Complete Graph 40.6 97.2 44.2
Revenue Sampled Graph 73.1 96.9 33.8
Revenue Correlated Values 68.4 99.7 13.3
Paced Welfare Complete Graph 46.3 91.4 39.7
Paced Welfare Sampled Graph 80.0 93.6 16.1
Paced Welfare Correlated Values 70.6 93.7 42.9
Welfare Complete Graph 60.0 92.4 5.3
Welfare Sampled Graph 88.0 92.2 2.6
Welfare Correlated Values 81.7 94.2 2.9
Table 2: Gaps between equilibria for different objectives and classes of problem instances.
often than revenue objectives. Neither feasibility MIP greatly outperformed the paced-welfare-maximizing
MIP. The feasibility MIP solved about as many instances as the relaxed version.
Grouping the realistic instances by m = 8, . . . , 15, the MIP respectively found the equilibria for all the
sub-cases in 43, 37, 30, 25, 19, 17, 16, and 15 instances out of the 50 combinations of country-hour pairs
that we considered. In agreement with the stylized instances, complexity increases as instances comprise
more goods.
8.3 Empirical Analysis of Equilibria
In this section, we use the MIP to improve our understanding of equilibrium properties among instances
we can solve. We focus on two properties of pacing equilibria that we covered in our analytical work, and
explore how they change as a function of instance size. First, do we frequently observe large empirical
differences in equilibria—that is, between the value-maximizing and value-minimizing equilibria—or do
such gaps only arise in pathological examples? Second, how frequently do we observe large incentives
for advertisers to misreport bids and budgets? How are such incentives affected by features of the pacing
instance?
8.3.1 Empirical Differences in Equilibria
Even though we have seen large gaps for instances constructed carefully for that purpose, we see that this is
not the case for the practically-inspired instances that we put forward. For each of those instances, we solve
a pair of MIPs to find the difference between the value-maximizing and value-minimizing equilibrium. We
then measure such gaps across sets of instances. We measure equilibrium gaps for revenue, welfare, and
paced welfare. For revenue and paced welfare, we have a MIP that finds extremal equilibria. Measuring
welfare gaps is less straightforward: Since we could not represent the welfare objective as a linear expres-
sion, we do not have a MIP to optimize. Instead, we compute the gap among the MIP solutions optimizing
the other objective functions. Hence, the reported gaps in social welfare are a lower bound on the maximal
achievable gap. We report the following metrics:
Pairs %: the percentage of instances for which a pair of MIPs (objective-maximizing and -minimizing)
both returned prior to the five-minute timeout.2
No Gap %: the percentage of paired instances with no gap in objective value.
Max Gap: the largest observed gap across instances, as a percentage of the objective-maximizing value.
2For the welfare objective, a pair was counted if any two MIPs where any objectives were solved.
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Figure 5: An overview of the steps to measure an advertiser’s gain in utility for strategically misreporting
values and budgets to the proxy bidder
Results Computing pacing equilibria for the stylized instances, we find that for the majority of instances,
there was no gap in the objective value across equilibria. In some cases, however, gaps were as large as
44.2%. The welfare objective had smaller gaps: all were less than 5.3%, but recall that for this objective
those are only lower bounds. Table 2 summarizes the empirical study of gaps.
Some instances reimained unsolved at the end of the time limit, and it could be that these instances also
have large gaps. To test this hypothesis, we looked at runtimes of solved instances with large gaps. The
conclusion is that these tend to be instances that can be solved quickly. For instance, none of the instances
with nonzero gaps took more than ten seconds to solve. This analysis suggests that longer runtimes arise
from sparseness of equilibria, rather than from their multiplicity.
The conclusions on equilibrium gaps also extend to realistic instances. We saw essentially no differences
for the 43 realistic instances for which the scaled-down instance had solutions for all objectives for at least
one number of clusters m. Only one unclustered instance had any revenue difference (and only for a single
choice of m): a difference of 0.03%. Only two unclustered instances had welfare differences: one with a
difference of 0.03% in a single clustering, and one with about 2.9% in every clustering. Only one unclustered
instance had paced welfare differences: 5.7% in the worst clustering, but 2-3% in the remaining clusterings.
Overall, these results are promising: Although our theoretical results demonstrated that gaps can be large
in theory, we found empirically that most gaps on instances we considered were small, and often times, there
was no gap at all.
8.3.2 Robustness to Misreporting
We now explore whether bidders can improve their performance by misreporting bids or budgets to affect the
pacing mechanism. Although Proposition 1 implies that bidders do not benefit from misreporting given the
current pacing equilibrium, bidders may improve their utility if they can influence the resulting equilibrium.
Example 8 highlighted such a case where a bidder significantly increased its utility by misreporting; we
investigate the extent to which misreporting may be a problem in practice with a computational study.
Concretely, we study the relation between the incentive to misreport and market thickness.
We consider a setting in which bidders submit a budget Bi and a single valuation vi for a generic item.
The valuation for specific items is then set to vij = viγij , where we assume that γij is fixed ahead of time.
This setting has been used to model Internet auction markets, where bidders typically submit their budget
and their valuations for clicks and the valuations are then multiplied by a click-through rate specific to each
impression-bidder pair.
We generated 40 instances, each with 4 auctions, 2 through 20 bidders, and budgets and valuations gen-
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Figure 6: Left: Percentage of instances with incentive to misreport. Right: Utility gain when misreporting.
erated according to the complete-graph setting described in Section 8.1. To model misreporting, we assume
that bidders may multiply their budgets and valuations, respectively, by scalars (βi, νi) ∈ {0.6, 0.8, . . . , 1.4}×
{0.5, 0.6, . . . , 1.4}. We consider that only a focal bidder per auction is strategically misreporting while the
others remain true to their actual values. The focal bidder submits scaled budgets and valuations to the
pacing mechanism, instead of the actual ones. With this setup, we solve the MIPs and compare the resulting
utility received by the focal bidder across all (βi, νi). An overview of the setup is shown in Figure 5.
Results We say that the focal bidder in an instance has an incentive to misreport when there is a combi-
nation (βi, νi) for which the bidder’s utility is higher than that when true values are reported. The left panel
of Figure 6 shows that the percentage of such instances decreases significantly as the number of bidders
increases. The right panel shows the utility gain that results from applying the multiplicative scalars. With
more bidders, it is optimal to report true budgets and valuations.
Since we only tried a discrete and finite set of scalars, one could argue that perhaps it would have been
optimal to use another scalar that was not in the set. To provide evidence that this is unlikely, we tried a
much finer discretization for 10 instances composed of 6 to 14 bidders. This time we considered scalars
(βi, νi) ∈ {0.6, 0.65, . . . , 1.4} × {0.5, 0.6, . . . , 1.4}; i.e., a step size of 0.05 instead of 0.2. Out of these 50
instances, we found only one instance for which a deviation increased the utility. It is also unlikely that we
needed a bigger interval of scalars: none of the instances we tested resulted in the optimal scalar being at
the extremes of an interval.
In summary, we found that the bidder was rarely incentivized to manipulate its bid or budget, and that the
incentive decreased as the size of the instance grew. Collectively, the empirical conclusions on equilibrium
properties reassure us that some of these potential problems may not actually be so in practice.
8.4 Seeding Dynamic Instances
Real-world pacing heuristics rely on tractable adaptive algorithms that update bidders’ pacing multipliers
over time. Recent results have shown that such algorithms can converge to stable pacing multipliers in the
limit, given simplifying distributional assumptions (Balseiro and Gur, 2019). While convergence in the limit
is a positive result, the rate at which the learning algorithm converges is important in practice: The longer
the pacing algorithm takes to converge, the worse it is at optimizing the bidder’s utility. This motivates us to
study how the stability of adaptive algorithms can be improved.
The adaptive algorithm we use for this set of experiments is from Balseiro and Gur (2019), which we
refer to as ADAPTIVEPACING; see Algorithm 1. ADAPTIVEPACING takes as input a pacing instance Γ, a
vector of initial pacing multipliers (αiniti )i∈N , a minimum allowable pacing multiplier α
min, and a step
size , which affects how much the multiplier changes across auctions. After each auction j ∈ M , each
bidder i updates its multiplier based on the difference between the bidder’s spend and its target per-auction
expenditure, which is the average amount to spend per auction to perfectly exhaust the budget.3
3In this paper, Algorithm 1 uses the notion of a multiplier α, which differs from the notion of a multiplier µ in Balseiro and Gur
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Algorithm 1: ADAPTIVEPACING (Balseiro and Gur, 2019)
Input: Pacing instance Γ = (N,M, (vij)i∈N,j∈M , (Bi)i∈N ); initial multipliers (αiniti )i∈N ;
minimum multiplier αmin; step size .
1 for i ∈ N do
2 Set target expenditure ρi = Bi/m;
3 Initialize remaining budget Bi1 = Bi and multiplier αi1 = αiniti ;
4 for j ∈M do
5 Each bidder i places bid bij = min(vijαij , Bij).
6 The auction outputs an allocation (xij)i∈N and payments (sij)i∈N .
7 Each bidder i updates its multiplier αi,j+1 = max(αmin, 1/max(1, 1/αij − (ρi − sij))) and
remaining budget Bi,j+1 = Bij − sij .
8 return bids, allocations, and payments;
Generate instance pair
Large Instances
small instance
Find pacing eq’m
for small instance
MIP solution Question: Is regret on large instances lower when 
heuristic algorithm is seeded 
with the MIP?
Run heuristics 
for large instance
output from 
heuristic seeded w/ 
MIP multipliers
output from 
heuristic seeded w/ 
baseline multipliers
large instance
Figure 7: Steps to measure the benefit from warm-starting heuristics with the MIP
We now describe the computational study that evaluates using the MIP to improve the adaptive algo-
rithm. Our study consists of running the adaptive algorithm on large instances, seeded from the pacing
multipliers of a small instance that compactly represents each of them. We compare outputs under two
types of initial multipliers: a unique constant for all bidders which is what one would do without additional
information (e.g., each bidder starts with multiplier 0.5), and the pacing multipliers returned by the MIP for
the original (static) instance. For each set of initial pacing multipliers, we determine parameters  and αmin
through grid search by choosing those that minimize the average ex-post relative regret (i.e., the average
amount that a bidder could have improved its utility by playing a single best-response multiplier, given the
other bids are fixed). This is summarized in Figure 7. (See Appendix D for analogous experiments on using
the MIP to improve existing algorithms of a one-shot model, where the tractable algorithm in that case is
best-response dynamics.)
In the case of stylized instances, we createK complete-graph instances, and scale each one up to produce
a large instance. To scale, we make C copies of each good, and scale budgets by C. For each edge in the
scaled-up graph, we perturb the bidder-good value by adding Gaussian noise with mean 0 and standard
deviation σ (this σ is different from that of the correlated stylized instances). The parameters we used for
these experiments are K = 6, C = 500, σ ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.5}, αmin ∈ {0.1, 0.05}, and  ∈ {0.01, 1, 2}.
In the case of realistic instances, recall that we take a large instance constructed from real data, and we
(2019); the relationship is α = 1/(1 + µ). Other minor differences from Balseiro and Gur (2019) are that (1) we made the initial
multipliers an explicit parameter to the algorithm; and (2) we removed per-bidder subscripts for αmin and , since all bidders use
the same value in our experiments.
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Figure 8: Mean relative regret from running ADAPTIVEPACING. Left: Stylized instances with various initial
pacing multipliers and noise levels σ. Right: Realistic instances with various initial pacing multipliers, as a
function of learning rate . Results shown for 8 clusters.
cluster it to make a compact representation (Section 8.1). In this case, we solve the MIP corresponding to the
clustered instance and then provide the resulting pacing multipliers as input when running ADAPTIVEPAC-
ING on the unclustered one.
Results As shown in Figure 8, running ADAPTIVEPACING with MIP-based initial multipliers produces a
lower regret than with other choices of initial multipliers. Performance of the MIP-based solution degrades
as the noise parameter σ grows, but even at the highest levels we considered, the MIP-based solution outper-
formed the baseline solutions. When using fixed initial multipliers, the resulting regret is highly sensitive to
choices in the step size: low initial multipliers would often not reach the MIP’s equilibrium multipliers by
the time the algorithm terminated. For realistic instances, Figure 8 also shows that the regret experienced
by bidders when starting from the MIP-based initial multipliers was lower than in the other cases, for every
learning rate  we considered. More strongly, the worst learning rate for the MIP was better than the best
learning rate for any of the baselines. These findings were robust to different number of clusters m when
producing the realistic instances. Surprisingly, 8 clusters was enough to find good multipliers and increasing
m to 15 clusters did not reduce the regret.
These experiments for the dynamic setting leave us optimistic about the potential value of computing
static pacing multipliers with the MIP. Using the MIP to warm-start an adaptive algorithm on these larger
instances resulted in better convergence, and these improvements were robust to noise in the MIP input. Such
robustness is important for two reasons: First, it suggests that the MIP does not need the exact valuation
distribution to be useful (which is unlikely to be known in practice); second, it suggests that the valuation
distribution could be compressed to create a smaller (approximate) problem instance that could be tractably
solved by the MIP. In follow up work, Kroer et al. (2019) address both of these issues.
Interpretation of MIP Solution
A natural question is whether the MIP output when solving static pacing has any interpretation regarding
the dynamic pacing setup we discussed. We provide evidence that the output of the adaptive algorithm
on the large instances matches the pacing multipliers computed by the MIP on the small instances. In
Appendix C, we describe a limit dynamics model and prove that a solution in that model is stable if and only
if it constitutes a pacing equilibrium (which the MIP outputs).
In a similar setup to the study of dynamic pacing with stylized instances, we randomly sampled K
complete-graph problem instances and run ADAPTIVEPACING with initial multipliers equal to the feasibil-
ity MIP output. For each instance, we compute the absolute difference between the MIP fractional allocation
and the empirical allocation (that is, the fraction of goods won in the scaled-up instance that corresponded to
the same good in the original instance). The parameters we used for this experiment were K = 20, C = 50,
αmin = 0.05, and  = 10−4; other parameter settings gave similar results.
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Figure 9: Left: An empirical CDF over absolute differences between the empirical allocation and the MIP
allocation. Empirical allocations were approximately equal to the MIP allocation across all instances. Right:
An example of bidders adaptively adjusting their pacing multipliers to effectively win a fraction of the good
type; the empirical allocation in this instance was approximately equal to the feasibility MIP fractional
allocation.
Results Figure 9 (Left) shows a summary of the absolute differences between the fractional allocations
output by the MIP and ADAPTIVEPACING. The difference between the fractions allocated never exceeded
0.07, and over 75% of the time, the difference was less than 0.02. To understand why the empirical alloca-
tions so closely match the MIP allocations, see Figure 9 (Right) for an illustrative example. The figure shows
the per-auction bids for a particular pacing instance, good type, and subset of bidders. In the original version
of this instance, the feasibility MIP found a solution in which three bidders won a fractional allocation of
the good. When we started ADAPTIVEPACING from the MIP output multipliers, the induced bids danced
around the winning price such that the empirical allocation for these bidders nearly matched the MIP output
(with allocation values of (0.51, 0.24, 0.25) versus (0.52, 0.24, 0.22) for each respective bidder).
These results illustrate that the MIP fractional multipliers have a meaningful interpretation for larger
instances in which one runs an adaptive algorithm.
9 Conclusion
In auction markets, bidders with budgets are not necessarily best off submitting their true valuations. We
considered multiplicative pacing and proved its optimality from the bidder’s viewpoint (Proposition 1). We
introduced a notion of pacing equilibrium (Definition 1 and Proposition 2), proved (a) their existence in
Theorem 1, (b) close relations to competitive equilibria in Section 5, and that (c) finding equilibria max-
imizing welfare and revenue is NP-hard in Theorem 3. We gave a MIP formulation for finding optimal
pacing equilibria and evaluated it experimentally. We found that although multiple equilibria may exist,
their paced welfare and revenue are frequently similar. For adaptive pacing, we found that regret-based
dynamics arrived at allocations near our MIP-based solutions, and that these allocations were improved by
warm-starting with solutions from our MIP, even when the MIP input was noisy. Our experimental findings
were robust to several different random models of markets, as well as markets generated from real-world
auction data.
While the MIP can only be run on small-enough instances, its solution has an interpretation for larger
instances, both when doing clustering or when valuations were drawn jointly across bidders in proportion
to valuations from the original instance. Using the MIP to warm-start an adaptive algorithm on these larger
instances indeed results in better convergence, and these improvements were robust to noise or to different
ways to generate the smaller instance from the larger instances.
A few open questions remain: What is the computational complexity of finding an arbitrary pacing
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equilibrium? Can we generalize to multiple-slot auctions or to a dynamic setting with uncertainty about
future auctions? Can we make further realistic assumptions on the primitives to get tractability or stronger
results? In dynamic settings, how do we improve the convergence to optimal equilibria? One direction is to
explore how to best compress extremely large problem instances—those with many bidders and many more
auctions—so that the MIP provides valuable output for warm-starting large-scale dynamic pacing problems.
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A Iterating Best Responses Cycles
Here, we provide step-by-step details of Example 2 which shows that iterating best responses may cycle.
• Initially, bidder 1 wins auctions 1 and 5 and pays 60; bidder 2 wins auctions 2, 3, 4, and 6 and pays
1928. Bidder 2 exceeds its budget of 1300 at these multipliers—it exhausts its budget from auction 2
alone, in which it pays 1300, and it also wins three other auctions. Bidder 2’s best response is to lower
its multiplier so that it wins only auction 2. To do so, bidder 2 sets its multiplier somewhere on the
interval (1300/6503, 5/25) ≈ (0.1999, 0.2): any lower, and its bid for auction 2 drops below bidder
1’s bid of 1300, in which case bidder 2 wins nothing; any higher, and its bid for auction 6 exceeds
bidder 3’s bid of 5, in which case bidder 2 exceeds its budget.
• After bidder 2 lowers its multiplier, bidder 1 wins more auctions: In addition to what it was win-
ning previously, bidder 1 also wins auction 3 at a price equal to bidder 2’s paced bid of at least
300.6(1300/6503) ≈ 60.09. Bidder 1 exhausts its budget of 60 from auction 3 alone. Bidder 1 must
set its multiplier low enough to not win auction 3, but such a multiplier is so low that it results in bid-
der 1 losing all other auctions. Bidder 1’s best response is to tie on auction 3, where bidder 2’s paced
bid is at most 300.6(5/25). To do so, bidder 1 sets its multiplier to at most 300.6(5/25)/123 ≈ 0.488.
• After bidder 1 lowers its multiplier, bidder 2 goes from losing to tying on auction 3, causing bidder 2
to pay more than it was previously for that auction, but it also pays much less for auction 2: Instead of
paying 1300 for auction 2 as it was previously, it pays around 1300(0.488) = 634.4. Because bidder
2 is paying so much less for auction 2, it can raise its multiplier to 1, causing it to win auctions 3, 4,
and 6 and to pay less than its budget.
• After bidder 2 raises its multiplier to 1, bidder 1 no longer wins auction 3. It can raise its multiplier to
1 and still not exhaust its budget. This brings us back to the first iteration, where all multipliers were
set to 1.
B Missing Proofs
B.1 Pareto Optimality of Competitive Equilibria
We prove formally that competitive equilibria are Pareto optimal, which is a known result, but we do it
specialized to our setting of bidders with budgets for concreteness.
Proposition 7 (The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics). Any competitive equilibrium is Pareto
optimal (when considering the utilities of all bidders and the seller).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose there is a Pareto dominating allocation of items and money.
Let pj denote the price of good j in the competitive equilibrium, Si the bundle received by bidder i in the
competitive equilibrium (and S′i in the dominating allocation), and ti = p(Si) ≤ Bi the amount of money
bidder i spends in the competitive equilibrium (and t′i ≤ Bi in the dominating allocation). Here, we let
p(S) =
∑
j∈S pj be the price of any bundle of items S under the competitive equilibrium prices. Now,
for every bidder i, it must be the case that t′i ≤ p(S′i). This is because either p(S′i) > Bi or vi(Si) −
p(Si) ≥ vi(S′i)−p(S′i) by the property of competitive equilibria, yet vi(Si)−p(Si) ≤ vi(S′i)− t′i by Pareto
dominance. If t′i < p(S
′
i) for some i, then it follows that the total payment in the dominating allocation is
less than the sum of the item prices, contradicting that the seller is at least as well off. On the other hand,
if t′i = p(S
′
i) for all i, then no bidder is better off, and also the seller is just as well off, again contradicting
Pareto dominance.
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B.2 NP-Hardness of Computing Pacing Equilibria
We first note the following proposition about our Example 10 for modeling binary choices.
Proposition 9. In Example 10, when α+ δ < 1/3, no equilibrium satisfies min(α1, α2) ≥ 3α.
Proof. The reason is that if such an equilibrium existed, the total price of the first two items would be at
least 6αK2 = 3(1− α− δ)K1 > 2K1 (which follows from the statement). This is the combined budget of
the two bidders, resulting in a contradiction.
With this proposition we are ready to prove our complexity result.
Theorem 3. MAX-REVENUE-PACING, MAX-WELFARE-PACING and MAX-PACED-WELFARE-
PACING are NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce an arbitrary 3SAT instance to the following MAX-REVENUE instance. We set T equal
to the number of clauses, plus 4 times the number of variables, in the 3SAT instance. For every variable
xj , we create a copy of Example 10, consisting of bidders 1xj , 2xj and items 1xj , 2xj , 3xj , 4xj , with bids
as specified in the example, using K1 = 4, α = 1/4, δ = 0, and (hence) K2 = 6. Each of these items
will only be bid on by the bidders corresponding to its own variable (the other bidders have valuation 0 for
them). However, the bidders will bid on other items as well, namely items corresponding to the clauses.
Specifically, we associate bidder 1xj with the literal +xj , and bidder 2xj with the literal −xj . A bidder
values a clause item at 1 if its literal occurs in that clause, and at 0 otherwise. Finally, we add a single bidder
with unlimited budget that values every clause item at 2. Hence, this bidder will necessarily win all the
clause items, at price at most 1 each.
Suppose a satisfying assignment exists. If xj is set to true, set α1xj = 1 and α2xj = α; otherwise, set
α1xj = α and α2xj = 1. This depletes the budgets of the bidders corresponding to variables, resulting in
a revenue of 4 times the number of variables. Moreover, for every clause item, the unlimited-budget bidder
faces one of the variable bidders with a multiplier of 1, since we had a satisfying assignment. Hence this
bidder pays an amount equal to the number of clauses. Hence the MAX-REVENUE-PACING instance
has a solution.
Conversely, suppose the MAX-REVENUE-PACING instance has a solution. Then, the unlimited-
budget bidder must pay at least an amount equal to the number of clauses. Because she pays at most 1 on
each clause item, it follows that she must pay exactly 1 on each clause item. Hence, at least one of the bidders
corresponding to positive literals in each clause must have a multiplier 1. But since, by Proposition 9, at
most one of the two bidders corresponding to a variable can have a multiplier of 1, it follows that these
bidders correspond to a satisfying assignment.
Now we switch to the welfare objective. We reduce an arbitrary 3SAT instance to the following MAX-
WELFARE instance. We set up bidders corresponding to variables as in the MAX-REVENUE proof. We
set α = δ = 18 , K1 = 1, and thus K2 = 3. We let V,C be the sets of variables and clauses in the 3SAT
instance, respectively. We set T equal to
δK1 + |V |
(
2K2 +
(
K1
α
+ 
))
=
1
8
+ |V |(14 + ),
For clauses, a bidder values a clause at value δK1|C| if its literal occurs in that clause, and at 0 otherwise.
Finally, we add a single bidder with unlimited budget that values every clause item at δK12|C| .
Suppose a satisfying assignment exists. Perform the assignment as in the MAX-REVENUE setting.
That gives a social welfare of |V |(2K2 + (K1α + )) from the variable items. Furthermore, for each clause,
at least one satisfied-literal bidder has its pacing multiplier set to 1, thus winning the clause item, yielding
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utility δK1|C| . Summing over the clauses gives the desired social welfare. Each bidder can at most win all the
clauses, and thus their spend is bounded by (1− δ)K1 + δK1, satisfying their budget constraint.
Conversely, suppose the MAX-WELFARE-PACING instance has a solution. Then each clause item
must be allocated to a satisfied-literal bidder. But, in order to beat the unlimited-budget bidder, the satisfied-
literal bidder must have a pacing multiplier of at least 12 . By Proposition 9, this means that the bidder
corresponding to the opposite literal must have a multiplier less than or equal to 38 . Therefore, the bidders
with pacing multipliers of at least 12 correspond to a satisfying assignment.
We can perform almost the same reduction for MAX-PACED-WELFARE-PACING. We construct
the same set of bidders and valuations. We set T equal to
δK1 + |V |
(
2K2 + α
(
K1
α
+ 
))
=
1
8
+ |V |
(
7 +

8
)
,
If a satisfying assignment exists, we can set the same pacing assignment as before. The only difference from
the previous construction is that the paced welfare from the variable items is now |V |(2K2 + (K1 + 8)).
Combined with the clause item assignment, this gives exactly the desired paced welfare.
The converse case becomes simpler. For any MAX-PACED-WELFARE-PACING solution, it must be
the case that each variable has at least one bidder with a pacing multiplier of 1. To obtain the remaining paced
welfare of δK1, these bidders with pacing multiplier 1 must correspond to a satisfying assignment.
B.3 Correctness of MIP Formulation
Proposition 8. A solution to the MIP (1)-(13) is feasible if and only if it corresponds to the conditions of a
pacing equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that all items j have some bidder i such that vij > 0. Otherwise, we preprocess the problem
by removing all items that no bidders are interested in.
First, let αi, xij ∈ [0, 1], sij ∈ R+ be a pacing equilibrium for a pacing game. Let all MIP variables be
set according to their definition as it pertains to the pacing equilibrium. Set xij = 1 if xij > 0. If there
are multiple bidders with xij > 0 for item j, set wij = 1, ri′j = 1 for two (and only those two) arbitrary
bidders i 6= i′ among the winners. We now show that all equations are satisfied. Constraint (1) is implied
by the third condition of pacing equilibria. Constraint (2) holds since we set yi = 1 exactly when bidder i
spends the whole budget. Constraint (3) is implied by our choice of yi combined with the third condition
of pacing equilibria. Constraint (4) is implied by the first condition of pacing equilibria. Constraint (5) is
implied by the third condition of pacing equilibria combined with the fact that bidders spend nothing on
an item unless they are allocated a non-zero amount. Constraint (6) and (7) are implied by our choice of
hj being the highest bid on item j and the fact that v¯j upper-bounds vij . Constraint (8) is implied by our
choice for wij , xij . Constraint (9) is satisfied because we set pj equal to the second price, and the constraint
is disabled for the highest bid due to wij = 1 and vij being an upper bound on αivij . Constraint (10) is
implied by our choice of setting rij = 1 only if bidder i constitutes the second price, and the fact that the
constraint is disabled for all other bidders. Constraints (11), (12), and (13) are implied by our choices for
wij , rij , respectively.
Now assume that we have some satisfying assignment to the MIP. To construct a pacing equilibrium,
assign pacing multipliers and spendings according to the values from the MIP, and set xij = sij/pj . We
now show that each of the three conditions for a pacing equilibrium are satisfied.
Constraint (4) implies
∑
i∈N xij =
∑
i∈N sij/pj = 1. If xij > 0 then sij > 0 and by (5) xij = 1,
therefore (6) and (7) imply αivij = hj . For all bidders i′ with xi′j = 0, we have αi′vi′j ≤ αivij , otherwise
we would violate (6) and thereby contradict our assumption of having a satisfying assignment. This shows
that the first condition of a pacing equilibrium is satisfied.
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We first show that, in a feasible assignment pj must be equal to the second price. pj is both upper and
lower-bounded by αivij for the bidder i such that rij = 1. Furthermore, (9) guarantees that pj is at least as
high as the second-highest bid. Finally note that if αivij is the highest bid hj and rij = 1, then there must
exist at least one other bidder such that αi′vi′j = hj because (13) ensures that wi′j = 1 for some i′, and
(7)-(8) then imply that bidder i′ must satisfy αi′vi′j = hj . This shows that pj is the second price. Now it
remains to note that all bidders i with xij > 0 pay pj , which is exactly the highest bid other than their own
for rij = 0. When rij = 1, we established that wi′j = 1 for some other bidder, and thus i and i′ must be
tied for first price, and bidder i is thus still paying the highest bid other than their own. This shows that the
second condition of a pacing equilibrium is satisfied.
Constraint (1) ensures that all budgets are satisfied. Constraints (2) and (3) ensure that if budgets are
not fully spent then yi = 0, and αi is then forced to be 1. This shows that the third condition of a pacing
equilibrium is satisfied.
C Pacing Dynamics
While there are no dynamics in the definition of our game, we consider dynamics to evaluate the quality
of the solutions provided by the equilibrium concept. It is instructive to consider the definition of pacing
equilibrium in the context of dynamics. Specifically, suppose that the items are sold continuously over the
period [0, 1]. I.e., at time t ∈ [0, 1] a fraction t of every item will have been sold. Within each infinitesimal
slice of time a second-price auction is used for each infinitesimal fraction of an item; if there is a tie for an
item then it may be split into arbitrary fractions xijt among the bidders, summing to 1 if there are positive
bids. In an ad auction, this would correspond to the limit case where there are large numbers of all types of
impressions, and the distribution of such types does not vary over time. Then, we can consider αi to change
dynamically over time (so we get αit). Specifically, if a bidder i is currently spending at a rate that will
overspend her remaining budget over the remaining period [t, 1], we decrease αit; if it will underspend and
αit < 1, then we increase αit. Call this the limit dynamics model.
Definition 7. Multipliers αi ∈ [0, 1] and fractions xij ∈ [0, 1] constitute a stable solution in the limit
dynamics model if setting αit = αi and xijt = xij (for all i, j, t) satisfies the feasibility conditions for the
xijt and is consistent with the dynamics (i.e., no αit ever needs to be adjusted up or down).
Proposition 10. Multipliers αi and fractions xij constitute a stable solution in the limit dynamics model if
and only if they constitute a pacing equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose they constitute a pacing equilibrium. Then, xijt is nonzero only if αijtvij = αijvij is one of
the highest bids, and for any j, t, we have
∑
i xijt =
∑
i xij ≤ 1 with equality if there is at least one positive
bid. For a bidder with
∑
j sij = Bi in the pacing equilibrium, we also have
1∫
t=0
∑
j sijt = 1·
∑
j sij = Bi, so
the bidder is always exactly on track to spend her budget and the multiplier need not be adjusted. For a bidder
with
∑
j sij < Bi in the pacing equilibrium we must have αi = 1; we have
1∫
t=0
∑
j sijt = 1 ·
∑
j sij < Bi,
so the bidder is always on track to underspend (which is fine because αit = αi = 1). Hence they constitute
a stable solution. Conversely, suppose they constitute a stable solution. Then
∑
i xij =
∑
i xij0 ≤ 1 with
equality if there is at least one positive bid. We also have pj = sij/xij = sij0/xij0 = pj0 which is the
second-highest bid αi0vij = αivij . For any bidder i,
∑
j sij =
1∫
t=0
∑
j sijt ≤ Bi. Finally, if αi < 1 then∑
j sij =
1∫
t=0
∑
j sijt = Bi (otherwise the multiplier would be adjusted and we would not have αijt = αij
for all t).
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Figure 10: BR dynamics convergence rate. For each iteration, we show the absolute difference in a bidder’s
multipliers from the previous iteration, averaged across bidders and instances. For MIP initialization we
average across solutions from all objectives.
D Experiments on Best-Response Dynamics (One-Shot Setting)
We considered best-response dynamics (BR dynamics) to search for a pacing equilibrium in the standard,
one-shot setting. We briefly describe these experiments here. BR dynamics can be thought of as a repeated
auction market where each bidder has some budget to spend every day and wishes to set its pacing multiplier
appropriately. At the end of each day, bidders observe the outcome for the day and best respond to the
strategy of the other players. Our goal in these experiments was to see whether warm-starting BR dynamics
with the MIP output can improve convergence of BR dynamics and lead it to outcomes with higher welfare
than it would otherwise achieve.
We consider two BR algorithms that differ in how the best response is computed. If there is more than
one BR pacing multiplier, we break ties towards the highest pacing multiplier (BR high), or towards the
lowest (BR low). Both algorithms always start from the same random initialization of pacing multipliers. In
addition, we consider BR high starting from the MIP solutions and refer to it as Init MIP. When needed, we
replace MIP in the name by a specific MIP objective. For the BR setting, we consider random tiebreaking
rather than having fractional allocations be part of the bids. Thus, a pacing equilibrium might not be stable
if it includes fractional allocations. We evaluated the BR algorithms on a subset of 50 instances taken
randomly from those in the computational study.
We start by looking at BR dynamics convergence and regret. Figure 10 shows that the BR algorithms
converge quickly in our computational study. They required less than 10 iterations to reach small oscillations
in pacing multipliers. Figure 11 shows the maximum relative regret across all bidders, averaged across
instances. The relative regret for a bidder is computed as the ratio of the utility-improvement they could get
by best responding, divided by the utility of the best response (i.e., the fraction of utility they are missing out
on). For the purposes of computing regret, when a bidder exceeds its budget, we do not set utility to negative
infinity; instead we penalize utility by the amount over budget multiplied by the spend-to-budget ratio times
paced-welfare-to-budget ratio. We see that both BR high and BR low have somewhat high relative regret,
missing out on 7.5%-12% utility. Contrary to this, Init MIP solutions perform well and are able to stay near
equilibrium for most instances.
Figure 12 shows the relative regret broken down by each algorithm. This plot shows that the poor
performance of initializing with the objective that minimized paced welfare was actually caused by a single
outlier.
Finally, we look at the improvement in market outcomes from seeding BR dynamics with the MIP
output. Figure 13 shows the revenue, welfare, and paced welfare achieved by the different BR dynamics
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Figure 11: Maximum relative regret over bidders in an instance for various BR algorithms averaged across
instances.
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Figure 12: Relative regret broken down by each algorithm. Each point represents a BR algorithm running
on a particular problem instance.
algorithms relative to the MIP. Each point in the plot shows the average performance of a given algorithm
relative to the solution maximizing each objective. BR low performs significantly worse than BR high across
all three dimensions. For revenue and welfare, they both perform significantly worse than the MIP solutions
as well, in spite of the fact that the BR solutions may not even respect budgets. The BR dynamics perform
significantly better with MIP initializations than without.
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the best value for each objective, averaged across bidders and instances.
E Additional Experimental Results and Details
This section describes our experimental setup in more detail than space permitted in the main body of the
paper and provides additional results.
E.1 Equilibrium Gaps
The experiments section reported on maximum gaps for different objectives and instance distributions. Here,
we show additional summary statistics. Figure 14 shows the relative gap compared to optimal solutions
for equilibria maximizing or minimizing the different objectives, measured with respect to each objective,
grouped by instance type.
E.2 Other Terms and Notation
We informally defined some terms in the experiments section, which we now define more precisely. For a
given scaled-up instance Γ˜, let kj ∈ M be the good type of auction j; this good type associates the auction
in the scaled-up instance with a good in the original instance. Let M˜j ⊆ M˜ be the set of auctions in the
scaled-up instance that have good type j (i.e., M˜j = {j′ ∈ M˜ : kj′ = j} for j ∈ M ). For a given run of
ADAPTIVEPACING on a scaled-up instance, let x′ij be the empirical allocation over good types: the fraction
of auctions that bidder i won for good type j ∈M . That is, let x′ij =
(∑
j′∈M˜j x˜ij′
)
/
(∑
i′∈N˜,j′∈M˜j x˜ij′
)
,
where x˜ij′ is ADAPTIVEPACING’s output allocation (∀i ∈ N˜ , j′ ∈ M˜ ). For a given run of ADAPTIVEPAC-
ING on a scaled-up instance, let a bidder’s regret be the difference between the bidder’s maximum possible
utility in hindsight (given fixed other-agent bids) and the bidder’s realized utility; let the max regret be the
maximum such regret across all bidders.
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Figure 14: Percentage optimality for equilibria maximizing or minimizing the different objectives, measured
with respect to each objective, grouped by instance type.
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